eral, and it happens to have important consequences regard-66 ing the dynamics of cultural accumulation. In a highly orig-67 inal approach, Mesoudi (2011) shows that, without this as-68 sumption, the cost of social learning constitutes a constraint 69 that limits the total amount of knowledge that a population is 70 able to maintain. In any case, nevertheless, these models do 71 not consider the competition between investments in herita-72 ble versus non-heritable -that is, disposable-capital.
In this article, we model cultural knowledge as a capital in which individuals invest at a cost. To this end, following other models of cultural evolution, we explicitly consider the investments made by individuals in culture as life history decisions. Our aim is to understand what then determines the dynamics of cultural accumulation. We show that culture can accumulate provided it improves the efficiency of people's lives in such a way as to increase their productivity or, said differently, provided the knowledge created by previous generations improves the ability of subsequent generations to invest in new knowledge. Our central message is that this positive feedback allowing cultural accumulation can occur for many different reasons. It can occur if cultural knowledge increases people's productivity, including in domains that have no connection with knowledge, because it frees up time that people can then spend learning and/or innovating. We also show that it can occur if cultural knowledge, and thus the higher level of resources that results from increased productivity, leads individuals to modify their life history decisions through phenotypic plasticity. Finally, we show that it can occur if technical knowledge reduces the effective cost of its own acquisition via division of labour. These results suggest that culture should not be defined only as a set of knowledge and skills but, more generally, as all the capital that has been produced by previous generations and that continues to affect current generations. Throughout our analysis, in the sake of simplicity, we 240 make the assumption that individuals have an exogenously 241 determined time budget L for their development (that is, for 242 investing in growth, learning, and/or innovation), after which 243 they stop developing and start investing exclusively in repro-244 duction. In other words, this entails that we assume (1) that 245 individuals follow a bang-bang strategy whereby they first al-246 locate all their resources to the development of their capital, 247 and then switch to an exclusive investment in reproduction 248 and (2) that the switching age (that is, the age at sexual ma-249 turity) is exogenously constrained and does not evolve in our 250 model. As a consequence of this simplifying assumption, we 251 do not consider here the trade-off between growth and repro- 
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where the parameters α and β, both strictly positive, repre-264 sent so-called elasticities of production, that is the respon-265 siveness of production to a change in either x or y. We will 266 always consider the case where α + β ≤ 1, which means that 267 total capital has diminishing returns (or at most a constant 268 return edge available for the next generation, that is z t+1 = y(L).
316
The objective of our model is to describe the dynamics of z t 317 from generation to generation. assumption that social learning is more efficient than inno-337 vation, the optimal allocation schedule consists in the three 338 following phases (see Fig. 1 , and Supporting Information 339 (SI) 1 for more details). 
This shows that population size, N , has a positive but satu-377 rating effect on the rate of cultural evolution at the frontier 378 (the derivative of r i with respect to N is positive but decreas-379 ing, and it tends towards 0 when N tends towards infinity).
380
As a result, the rate of cultural evolution increases with N 381 but asymptotically tends towards a maximum ληκ λ+ηκ for large 382 population sizes. This is a consequence of the fact that in- 
where r c and r i are given respectively by equations 2 and 3 a population is the ratio K ≡ r c −r i r c , which is given by This cumulative potential depends on three factors (see where the rate of cultural growth is therefore r i ≈ r c ).
477
Culture can therefore not accumulate in an infinite pop- the case owing to two, apparently distinct, mechanisms.
488
The first mechanism, the only one considered in model 1,
489
is the fact that, under some conditions, we may have r c > r i .
490
That is, social learning is sometimes more efficient than in- In reality, however, these two mechanisms are not distinct.
511
Rather, the first is a special case of the second. According 512 to this mechanism, the culture of a population benefits in-513 dividuals by allowing them to acquire skills and knowledge 514 more rapidly, and at a lower cost, than if they had had to in- First, the special-case mechanism only works in small 531 populations where innovation is actually a limiting factor, 532 whereas the generalized mechanism can operate in prin-533 ciple at all population sizes, including in infinite popula-534 tions. Second, while cultural accumulation under the special-535 case mechanism is necessarily decelerating due to the ever-536 increasing burden of knowledge (Fig. 2) , under the general-537 ized mechanism, cultural evolution needs not always decel- In the following, we aim to illustrate how these generalized effects of culture could occur. To this aim, we build a second model, similar to the first, but in which the productivity of individuals depends on their capital. As in the first model, individuals develop by accumulating two types of capital, x and y, and they are characterized at each moment of their lives by a production function given by equation 1. But here, unlike in the first model, this production is invested in the growth of x and y. If an individual of age a has amounts of capital x(a) and y(a), respectively, and invests a fraction d(a) of his production in innovation, a fraction l(a) in learning, and a fraction 1 − d(a) − l(a) in growth, x(a) and y(a) experience instantaneous increases:
dy(a) da = (ηd(a) + λl(a))) · P (x(a), y(a)) (8) 
637
We have introduced these two types of plasticity into our 638 model. Formally, the age at sexual maturity is captured by the 639 parameter L, and parental care is captured by our parameter 640 P 0 measuring the productivity of individuals that is indepen-641 dent of their own capital. In both cases, for simplicity, we 642 assume that they increase with the level of resources of the 643 parental generation, that is L and/or P 0 in generation t + 1 644 increase with the amount of knowledge z t available in the 645 previous generation. Here we show results in the case where 646 only L is plastic. We assume that L(·) is a sigmoid function, 647 with a sudden change in strategy when z t exceeds a threshold.
648
This assumption leads, again, to bi-stable dynamics, with a 649 sudden acceleration of cultural evolution when individuals' 650 life history strategy changes ( Fig. 5 (e-h) ). This occurs, here, 1995, chapter 10). 1260 We consider a population of N individuals and we con-1261 sider to simplify a good for which the demand is constant.
1262
The good has a benefit b and each of the N individuals in 1263 the population needs exactly one and only one token of this 1264 good. Among the N individuals in the population, n are pro-N n − φ + π N n + b − p (16)
We assume that the number of producers, n, and the price of would therefore not be in equilibrium. This implies the con-1295 dition p N n = φ + π N n , which gives us the equilibrium price 1296p (n) at which the good is sold when there are n producers:
When the good is sold at the equilibrium pricep(n), individ-1298 uals share the cost of producing the goods in such a way that 1299 everyone earns the same payoff given by b −p(n).
1300
(2) Efficiency condition. The number of producers n 1301 should be such that the average payoff of individuals is max-1302 imized when the good is sold at the equilibrium pricep(n).
1303
In combination with the condition 17 above, this implies that 1304 thep(n) is minimized. So this gives us 1305n = arg min n n N φ + π N n (18)
From these two conditions, and with the production cost given by equation 15, we obtain the optimal number of producersn given byn
In other words,ŝ corresponds to the optimal division of
